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1. Introduction  
The organization of social life has never been easy to achieve (Bouckaert et.al. 2010). 
Traditionally, public authorities have tried to accomplish this complex and difficult task through 
the use of vertical coordination and integration mechanisms (i.e. the Weberian bureaucracy). 
During the last decades however, a number of societal and economic evolutions have diminished 
the capacity of governments to organize society based on strict hierarchical lines of authority 
(Agranoff 1990; Huxham 2000; Keast 2004). Especially at the local level, governments are 
confronted with complex social issues and problems that require an integrated response 
through coordination between a wide range of actors from both the public, nonprofit and the 
private sector (Bogason 2002; Pierre 1999). As a result, new modes of governance like 
partnerships and networks become increasingly popular in various policy areas (Rhodes 1997; 
Pierre and Peters 2000).  This also means that those concepts are increasingly reflected in the 
discourse of central or local governments or that  imposing network – like arrangements 
becomes part of the regular tool kit of governments. The hierarchical way of coordination then is 
used to install top – down networks. Each government could use this type of strategy within the 
realm of their own competencies. In this paper the focus is on the multi - level relations: what 
happens at the local level when central government intervenes in a policy domain by installing 
and imposing in a top – down manner local network – like arrangements?  
Over the years, governance scholars developed the concept of metagovernance to analyze the 
roles public authorities play in these settings. In its most strict sense, metagovernance is about 
the regulation of self-regulating networks, about guiding at a distance without losing control 
(Jessop 1998 and 2001; Kooiman 1993; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). In most studies of meta-
governance, the focus is on horizontal relations between the meta-governor and the set of 
network participants: how should for instance a local government regulate or meta-govern  local 
                                                          
1 This text is based on research conducted within the frame of the Policy Research Centre on 
Governmental Organization ‐ Decisive Governance (SBOV III ‐ 2012‐2015), funded by the Flemish 
government. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not those of the Flemish 
government. 
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networks developed from the bottom up? But what happens when central government is the 
meta-governor of local networks? Especially in the Flemish region this question is highly 
relevant: in a lot of policy domains the Flemish government uses network-like concepts for 
installing local partnerships and in most local networks, Flemish government is involved, in one 
way or another (e.g. the study of Voets and Verhoest 2012 on integrated youth care in Flanders).  
While governments meet the challenge to make meta-governance effective to deal with policy 
problems or to provide public services through those  self-regulation networks, scholars need to 
develop the concept further to make it useful for developing governance theory and doing 
empirical research, also in and for multi-level settings. Part of that challenge is to deal with the 
murky area to decide what makes government’s actions meta-governance or something else. 
Another challenge is to see whether the meta-governance concept, with its primary use in the 
context of policymaking and policy networks dealing with wicked problems, also fits a context of 
policy implementation or service delivery – although such distinction can be artificial as 
networks often feature degrees of both (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008). Finally, as 
metagovernance and the concept of networks are intertwined, the latter needs to be dealt with 
as well. Although scholars refer to ‘self-regulating networks’, they are still ‘influenced’ in some 
way by the government. What then is the degree of ‘self-regulating’? Is it possible that local 
networks installed from the top down develop self-regulating activities in the shadow of central 
regulation, or maybe even due to incentives by the central government? Is self-regulation a 
feature of networks that can be activated, even in the context of centrally formatted local 
networks?  
In this paper, we set out to use the concept of meta-governance in a multi-level context, to 
explore how service delivery networks involving different public and private partners at the 
local level are shaped and managed by different governments involved. From our perspective, 
meta-governance then is about the relationship between central government and local networks 
and refers to the way central government shapes and manages local service delivery networks. 
The particular multi-level setting implies that central government is not the only one with such 
meta-governance capacity; local government for instance has some power as well. 
For this purpose, we address three research questions: What is the governance mix in cases of 
centrally designed local networks, with different public authorities (central and local level) 
involved in the network and focused on coordinated service delivery? How does that governance 
mix match the concept of meta-governance as we know it? Finally, what does this complexity of 
relationships and governing styles tells us about the self-governing capacity of local service 
delivery networks, and the role(s) of government(s) in these settings?  
We bring in one Flemish case to deal with these questions empirically. Our case is located in the 
field of employment policy, where local networks are popular in an attempt to provide an 
integrated response to local labor market issues (see amongst others Mc Quaid et.al. 2006; 
Considine 2006). The particular case is such a partnership in Flanders (Belgium), namely the 
local job centres (‘lokale werkwinkels’) which function as a one-stop shop or single gateway for 
unemployed people, integrating services from both public and private actors in the field 
(Struyven and Van Hemel, 2009).  
The article is structured as follows. In the first section we introduce the analytical framework 
used for our analysis. We develop the concepts of meta-governance and networks, using the 
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coordination literature on hierarchy, markets, and networks (Bouckaert et.al. 2010). The next 
section reports the case studied. We conclude with lessons learned, reflecting on the concept of 
meta-governance. 
2. Towards an analytical framework 
2.1 Overall framework for the research project  
The research questions dealt with in this paper are part of a wider research project about the 
performance of local service delivery networks that are part of a multi-level setting. In the 
following figure we present the basic model of our research.  The research project is based on 
three case studies with three embedded cases in each case (Yin, 1994). Each network for each of 
the policy domains under study (health care, social economy and water policy) shows a different 
combination of sets of roles played by the Flemish government.  
Figure 1 – Framework of network effectiveness in multi-level settings 
 
The case reported in this paper is a first attempt to use this framework for analysis.  We do not 
apply all the elements of the framework systematically but we focus on the issue of coordination 
in multi-level local networks (as part of the network context) and the impact hereof on network 
functioning. 
2.2 Local networks: a typology for multi-level analysis 
Defining networks and typologies is a never ending story in the network literature (Voets, 
2008). Although definitions vary, a network typically involves “structures of interdependence 
involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal 
subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement” (O’Toole 1997: 45).  
Different typologies of networks have been developed over the years (e.g. the three C’s of Keast 
et al. 2007; see also the Agranoff typology consisting of four network types). Those typologies 
focus mainly on the goals and the nature of the network relations in the networks. For our goal, a 
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supplementary typology is needed, focusing on the formal features of local networks from a 
multi-level perspective. We distinguish five types of local networks in the Flemish region (De 
Rynck et. al. 2013):  
1. Centrally designed local service delivery networks 
2. Traditional local service delivery networks, locally designed 
3. New local service delivery networks, locally designed 
4. Policy networks at supra – local level, centrally designed 
5. Local policy networks, locally designed 
We make a double crossed distinction between (1) local service delivery networks and local 
policy networks for wicked problems and  (2) the meta-governance focus: who is the main meta-
governor for each of the network types: central or local government? Our case in this paper is a 
network type of category 1: the Flemish government at the central level designs a certain type of 
networked-like local arrangement for a specific service delivery goal, which is applied 
throughout the Flemish territory.  
2.3 Bringing in meta-governance theory 
Traditionally, the concept of metagovernance is used by network governance scholars to 
address the issue of how public authorities try to coordinate new governance arrangements like 
networks and partnerships. From this viewpoint, metagovernance encompasses different ways 
of governing collaboration (Sørensen 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2009; Klijn and Koppenjan 
2004; Haveri et.al. 2009). To our knowledge, it is mostly associated with policy networks. 
Amongst others, Sørensen (2006) states that hierarchical integration mechanisms do not apply 
to settings in which emphasis lies on the capacity of self-governing actors. Instead, public 
authorities should rely on more subtle forms of governance, which permit them to let go without 
losing control (see also Kelly 2006). Hence, meta-governance theoretically rests on the sharing 
of power, authority and control in multi-actor settings where governments do not take a 
hierarchical position (Keast 2004; Voets et.al. 2012).  But what happens when local networks are 
created due to a one-sided top-down hierarchical intervention by central government and, 
maybe, even develop some self-regulating activities within that framework?  
Sørensen (2006), later on refined by Sørensen and Torfing (2009), identifies four distinct meta-
governance roles that state actors can adopt in policy networks. The meta-governance tools 
range from more distant hands-off tools (design and framing) towards hands-on approaches 
(management and participation) in which there is a close interaction between public actors and 
the network members.2 The first tool in the meta-governance tool-box is hands-off network 
design. Following the authors, this role aims to ‘influence the scope, character, composition and 
institutional procedures of the network’ (p. 246). In the network design role, government seeks 
to create social and political meaning and identity for the network. The second role is network 
framing. Hereby government sets out the political goals, financial conditions and legal basis for 
the network. In practice, network framing can include a range of different activities. Network 
                                                          
2
 In the 2006 article, Sørensen uses the concept of storytelling instead of network design and network facilitation 
instead of network management. In this article we use the more recent typology of Sørensen and Torfing (2009) 
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management focuses on facilitating and guiding interactions in the network. In this role 
governmental actors try for example to settle conflicts or reduce tensions amongst network 
members. In the fourth role, network participation, the public metagovernor becomes one of the 
members of the network. In network participation, state actors do not take on a hierarchical 
position. Sørensen and Torfing state that public metagovernors should best adopt a mix of 
hands-off and hands-on meta-governance tools.   
What happens when we apply those four ideal typical roles in multi-level settings? In our case 
the Flemish government is the designer and the most important framing authority for all the 
local networks of type 1 in Flanders. Design and framing in those settings is something different 
compared to the tailor-made interventions of one government designing and framing one 
network. Still, it is in a certain way designing and framing networks. What happens when those 
local networks develop self-regulating activities, despite or even stimulated by the design and 
framing of the central government? And what is the meaning of managing and being actor in the 
network when a whole set of similar local networks all over the area are created by central 
government?  While the content and meaning of those roles maybe changes in this type of 
networks, in our opinion the meta-governance approach can still be useful, as we will 
demonstrate further on.   
In the multi-level settings, meta-governance roles become even more blurred because different 
governments are active in the setting and all have some meta-governance powers. We will 
illustrate this point in the case section. We feel that the potential of the meta-governance needs 
to be set against such multi-level or intergovernmental reality and hope it helps to bring a 
nuanced picture to life.  
2.4 From governance to meta-governor  
To analyze governance behavior in practice, the literature provides a useful basis to build on 
with the trinity of hierarchy, market, and network (Thompson et.al. 1991; O’Toole 1997; Powell 
1990; Keast et.al. 2006; Osborne 2010). These three mechanisms can be translated into 
typologies of instruments (see Verhoest et.al. 2010; Bouckaert et.al. 2010). The three  
mechanisms and instruments are used by government “to influence the decisions and the 
behavior of other governments or private partners in order to achieve government objectives” 
(Verhoest et.al. 2010: 5).  
Hierarchy reflects the traditional command-and-control style of policy making and 
implementation, rooted in the Weberian bureaucracy and resting on the existence of rules, 
procedures and strict lines of control (Bouckaert et.al. 2010). Some often heard critiques on this 
governance form is the lack of flexibility and resilience on the side of implementation units 
towards the dominant position of governments. The fundamental idea of the market model is 
price setting in a competitive setting of supply and demand. The adoption of market oriented 
governance mechanisms within public policy theoretically derives from the public choice theory 
and economic neo-institutionalism (Bouckaert et.al. 2010). Some basic features of the model are 
contractual agreements, result-oriented financing and the use of performance norms and 
monitoring (Voets et.al., 2012). The third mechanism is the network model. Networks lean on 
horizontal coordination through negotiation, mutual trust and reciprocity between mutual 
interdependent actors (Powell 1990; Kickert et.al. 1997; Peters 2003; Klijn and Koppenjan 
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2000). The latter provides networks with collaborative advantage (Huxham 1996).  Table 1 
outlines concrete coordination instruments governments can apply.  
Table 1 – a typology of coordination instruments 
(Based on Verhoest et.al. 2010; Bouckaert et.al. 2010) 
Hierarchical instruments 
 Restrictive rules 
 Veto power and power of annulment  
 Detailed procedures 
 Ex ante authorization and approval 
 Input-based financing  
 Direct control and supervision 
 Direct instructions 
Market based instruments 
 Contractual agreements 
 Performance based monitoring 
 Performance control and audit provisions 
 Result-oriented reporting 
 Result-oriented financing  
 Result-oriented incentives and sanctions 
 Benchmarking 
Network based instruments 
 Network management 
 Mutual control (frequent personal contacts, extensive consultation and 
collaborative procedures) 
 Co-decision making 
 Involving stakeholders and peers in the process 
 Partnership agreements 
 
Hierarchies, markets and networks present the ideal types of governance. Although separated at 
the normative level, in practice those integration mechanisms are often adopted in combination. 
Rhodes (1997), followed by Keast, Brown and Mandell (2006), states that “it is the mix that 
matters.” Hence, good governance is the result of dynamic combinations of the three models 
(Meuleman 2008; Bryson and Crosby 2009). We use this typology to analyze the governance mix 
in the case. By mapping the formal and especially the actual governance patterns in the case we 
studied, we try to add more flesh to the metagovernance bones.  
3. Methodology 
In the case of the local job centres, data is obtained through 12 semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with partners of three local job centres in the city of Ghent (the second biggest city of 
Flanders). Respondents are located at the Flemish Public Employment Service (both at regional 
and at local level), the Department of Work of the city of Ghent and the nonprofit partners 
(‘PWA’). Interviews were done between November 2012 and January 2013. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. Afterwards, data has been coded (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In 
addition to the interviews, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of written material.  
4. Case: the local job centres in Flanders  
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4.1 Introducing the case 
In Flanders, employment policy is a shared responsibility between the federal government, the 
Flemish government and the local governments. This multi-level reality is the result of an 
ongoing process of regionalization (in which federal government devolves competences to 
regional governments in Belgium) and a policy shift in which cooperation between agencies, 
local embedding and transparency of services became the new guiding principles for the 
formulation and implementation of employment policy (Struyven and Van Hemel, 2009: 1056). 
The multi-level policy cooperation is anchored in a framework agreement between the 
departments and agencies of the three institutional levels (Partnerschapsverdrag, 1999). In 
2000, the new policy paradigm is implemented operationally through the foundation of the local 
job centres. Public, private and nonprofit actors work together in these local partnerships 
around two pillars: integrated services and the development of a local service economy. 
Currently, there are 134 local job centres in Flanders, four of them situated in the city of Ghent.  
The principles of the framework agreement are confirmed at the local level through a Local 
Partnership Agreement in which each local actor gives support for the two objectives of the 
network. Also, partners engage to strengthen mutual cooperation with each other (Local 
Partnership Agreement, Art. 3). 
Based on these elements, the basic network features seem present: horizontal relations between 
governments, written down in a partnership agreement; local embeddedness in a network 
structure joining public and private actors that in theory will deliver services customized to 
individual clients’ needs; the need to connect and exchange resources and manage dependencies 
to help them with trajectories to find work.  
The framework agreement between the federal and the Flemish ministers of Work and the 
Flemish Association of Cities and Communities – as representative of the local authorities - 
mandates the Flemish Public Employment Service (‘Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling en 
Beroepsopleiding‘ or VDAB) as coordinator of the integrated employment services. The 
integrated services join the basic services of the VDAB (i.e. intake and trajectory guidance) with 
those of the local partners. Since 2004, the local job centres have a legal basis in the VDAB 
decree (= a regional law). The VDAB is an autonomous semi-public institution or agency with 
more than 4.900 employees, at a distance of the Flemish government contracted out and based 
on a performance contract (Struyven and Verhoest, 2005). The current performance contract 
(2011 – 2015) defines five strategic objectives that are refined into eighteen concrete objectives. 
Also, the contract formulates strict performance targets per each objective (Performance 
Contract 2011 – 2015, Annex 2). Table 2 gives a schematic overview of concrete objectives and 
performance targets for strategic objective 1: A maximal and tailor made activation of all 
jobseekers and other non-active people with the intention of a durable integration in the labor 
market.  
Table 2- Performance targets for the VDAB 
Strategic objective 1: A maximal and tailor made activation of all jobseekers and other 
non-active people with the intention of a durable integration into the labor market 
Operational objective Measurement 
frequency 
Performance target 
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Activation of job seekers < 25 age 4 x year 57.0 % 
Activation of job seekers between the 
age of 25 and 50 
4 x year 47.5% 
Activation of job seekers > 50 age 4 x year 30% 
Activation of the unemployed > 1 year 4 x year 11.5% 
Activation of unemployed within 
disadvantaged groups 
4 x year 18% 
Activation of unemployed subject of 
collective dismissal 
4 x year 40% 
 
The VDAB is internally decentralized and each of the five Flemish provinces has its own VDAB 
unit. The decentralized VDAB units translate the policy directives at the local level. Within the 
VDAB, a long standing debate is going on related to the degree of decentralization and the 
autonomy of the local units of the VDAB.  Of course this is crucial for a good understanding of the 
dynamics in the local networks. The central directions and central management of the VDAB 
could adopt a ‘meta-governance’ style vis-à-vis their decentralized units, giving them some room 
to set up tailor-made networks for specific target groups. But the main dynamics seem to go in 
the other direction: management systems are established and the degree of centralization seems 
to be reinforced, mainly due to the political and financial pressure on the organization. Instead 
of relying on a meta-governor style, the VDAB seems to be dominated by a strong and even 
reinforced top-down hierarchy.  
In analysing the multi-level setting around the partnership of the local job centres, we discover 
three possible ‘moments of meta-governance’:  
1. The Framework Agreement between the federal, Flemish and local governments and 
the given autonomy herein for the composition and functioning of the local networks; 
2. The relationship between the Flemish government and its agency (the VDAB); 
3. The dynamics and the coordination strategy within the VDAB, including the way this 
organization might reflect on its own role as manager and actor in networks. 
These moments reflect certain points of alternative; there have been made choices about the 
design, framing and management of the network, although other options were available. 
Figure 1 shows the multi-level and multi-actor composition of the network. The partners of the 
local job centres are marked in green. 
Figure 1 –Multi-actor and multi-level composition of the partnership (own composition) 
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The VDAB is the most important partner of the network. As mandated coordinator of the first 
pillar, the VDAB is responsible for the implementation of public employment services in 
Flanders. This is in part realized through the partnership of the local job centres, where trained 
VDAB consultants provide trajectory guidance for job seekers. Trajectory guidance is defined as 
“intensive and individual guidance for job seekers which increases their chances on the labour 
market by means of a ‘customized trajectory.’ It is a flexible, continuous process from intake to 
job consolidation” (Administratie Werkgelegenheid, 2000). A trajectory may comprise several 
steps or modules. There are seven distinct modules: (1) universal services, (2) screening and 
trajectory determination, (3) job-search training, (4) job-specific training, (5) personal training, 
(6) training on the job and supervision at the workplace, (7) trajectory guidance and follow-up 
(Struyven and Verhoest, 2005). Screening and trajectory determination (module 2) is always 
done by the VDAB. For the concrete realization of the trajectory (modules 3 – 7), other partners 
can be responsible as well.  
A second partner at Flemish level is the organisation for guidance of people with a labor 
disability (‘Gespecialiseerde Dienst voor Trajectbepaling en –begeleiding’, GTB). The GTB is a 
non-profit organization who provides trajectory guidance for the disabled. Since 2006, the GTB 
receives its annual grants from the VDAB (and not anymore through direct funding from the 
Flemish government). At the federal level, the National Employment Office (‘Rijksdienst voor 
Arbeidsvoorziening’ or ‘RVA’) is responsible for the payment of  unemployment benefits. The 
RVA is also the principal of the local employment agencies (‘Plaatselijke 
Werkgelegenheidsagentschap’ or ‘PWA’). The PWA’s are local nonprofit organizations (created 
at the level of one municipality or a group of municipalities) that provide work experience for 
the long-term unemployed. Their installation comes under the responsibility of the local 
governments (each municipality has a PWA), who act as an executive body of the RVA. The local 
governments involved in the network are the local Public Centres for Social Welfare (‘Openbare 
Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn’ or ‘OCMW’)3 and the cities and municipalities. While each 
                                                          
3
 Each city or municipality has an OCMW. They enjoy a certain level of political and managerial autonomy and 
have a legal basis in federal law. The links with the cities and municipalities are currently strengthened (e.g. the 
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OCMW is responsible for the payment of subsistence wage and job-seeking activities of social 
assistance clients, the city or municipality is responsible for the development of social 
employment initiatives, like cleaning help, community development work, and odd-job services. 
Since those initiatives are of a local nature, the local governments are mandated as coordinator 
of the second pillar. (Struyven and Van Hemel, 2009). 4 
Table 1 outlines the main characteristics of the two pillars. In this analysis, the focus will be on 
the first pillar, since the intergovernmental dimension and the meta-governance complexity 
expresses itself most prominent around this issue. 
Table 1 – Characteristics of the local job centres in Flanders  
(Struyven en Van Hemel, 2009: 1058) 
  
First pillar 
 
 
Second pillar 
Type of service 
 
Target groups 
 
 
Director 
 
Partners 
 
 
 
 
 
Total number operating in 
2013 
Integrated services 
 
Unemployed job seekers 
Employers 
employees 
Public employment service  
 
VDAB 
PWA 
Local authorities/ OCMW 
(GTB) 
 (Nonprofit organisations) 
 
134 
 
Local services economy 
 
Local services economy users 
 
 
Local authorities 
 
Local authorities 
PWA service company 
 
 
 
 
Mainly in the thirteen lager 
cities 
 
4.2 Analyzing the case 
We now use the typology of instruments to analyze the governance mix in the partnership of the 
local job centres. We make a distinction between the formal presence of types of instruments 
and the actual use hereof in the local job centres in Ghent. This analysis allows us to assess to 
what extent the actual dynamics are that of a network and helps us to explain the meta-
governance roles of central government in centrally designed local service delivery networks. 
Network based coordination instruments 
We identify three network based coordination instruments who are formally intended at 
strengthening the interaction and cooperation at the local level. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
OCMW chairperson is now member of the College of Mayor and Aldermen, which is the political executive 
board of the city or municipality) 
4
 This could be considered as a next level of meta-governance, concerning the way local governments shape 
the social economy through networking with various partners, being mandated to do so by central 
government.  
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Following art. 7 of the Interadministrative Framework Agreement, a local partnership 
agreement (‘LPA’) has to be signed between the partners of the local job centres. The local 
partnership agreement lists the representatives of each partner at the local level and outlines 
the commitments of each member. A concept for the Local Partnership Agreement was made in 
2009. Formally, there is a possibility to customize the LPA to the local labor market situation. 
However, respondents of the local authority and the PWA reported that the Local Partnership 
Agreement in Ghent was meaningless, because the VDAB does not live up to the commitments 
listed in the LPA. 
A second network instrument is the executive board. The executive board is composed of the 
local representatives the members; minimal one representative of the VDAB and one 
representative of the local government (VDAB Decree 2004, Art. 20 § 3). The task of the 
executive board is to make agreements about the daily operation of the job centres (Local 
partnership agreement MODEL, 2009: Art. 10 § 2). These are for example decisions about budget 
spending or staffing and communication about local activities and actions. In the case of Ghent, 
one executive board is competent for the three job centres. That executive board consists of ten 
members: one representative of each local partner plus the three local job centre managers 
(who are VDAB employees). The executive board meets two times per year. In Ghent, the 
relevance of the executive board is said to be hollowed out as respondents state that the local 
partners are not meaningfully consulted during meetings. The executive board is considered 
merely a place where other partners are informed about decisions that have already been taken 
by the VDAB and the low frequency of the meetings is an indicator for the decisions that are 
made in this meetings. 
In response to the growing unemployment rates, the VDAB board recently decided to install a 
‘city-manager’ in the two biggest cities of Flanders (Antwerp and Ghent). This manager is the 
third network instrument. The city-manager has to synchronize the employment initiatives of 
both the VDAB and the local governments. The city-manager also has to monitor the local 
embeddedness of the VDAB employment directives, which are implemented via the local job 
centres. In Ghent, a city manager was installed in May 2012. However, hardly one year later, the 
function is vacant for the second time. The following quotation points to the apparent 
uselessness of a city-manager in Ghent:  
“I think she quit the job partly of frustration. There is very little to accomplish at the local 
level. All decisions are already been made and the only thing you can do is to apply some 
grease to keep things going” (Interview PWA). 
Market based coordination instruments 
The VDAB uses the partnership of the local job centres to achieve its objectives and targets as 
outlined in its current performance contract with the Flemish government (2011 – 2015). 
Therefore, the different steps in the process of trajectory guidance are consciously monitored. 
To this end, all local partners enter client data into one single computer system: the VDAB Client 
Monitoring System. Monitoring categories include for example the number of intakes or the 
number of job-trainings given in a certain period.  
However, contradictory to the performance-based monitoring and evaluation within the VDAB 
(see section 4.1), the registration of the different activities of the local job centres is not linked to 
financial incentives. One of the local partners explains: 
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“The numbers are automatically registered. But there is no performance norm with 
budgetary consequences. There are reports, they give a quantitative overview but it’s not a 
commitment” (Interview PWA) 
The absence of performance norms in the local job centres seems somewhat contradictory to the 
market-based philosophy of the performance contract of the VDAB. However, it may back up the 
statement of the local partners that the VDAB shows only little interest in the partnership of the 
local job centres as an instrument for the activation of unemployed people. If the VDAB feels it 
cannot achieve its performance targets within this partnership, its apparent disinterest in the 
latter might also be explained.  
On the other hand, local partners have the feeling that the VDAB is drawn to a market operation 
based outsourcing policy in order to reach its targets. The market philosophy for guidance and 
activation of the unemployed was introduced by the Flemish government in 2004, following an 
international trend whereby public and private actors work together in the field of employment 
services. The VDAB Decree authorizes the Advisory Board of the agency to regulate the 
partnership agreements with private actors (VDAB Decree, Art. 12, 4°). The outsourcing policy is 
mostly adopted for specialized trajectory guidance for which the VDAB lacks the capacity and 
the expertise. However, the outsourcing policy of the VDAB is not without problems. One 
interviewee states:  
“Local employment service has become a synonym for the implementation of tenders who 
are formulated at central VDAB level” (Interview city of Ghent) 
The above quotation shows that the outsourcing policy of the VDAB is not a pure example of a 
market based model, since it leaves little room for other partners to influence the scope of the 
contract. 
In principle, tenders may involve both public, private and nonprofit players. In practice, the 
tenders of the VDAB are said to be tailored to the size of large private players and local public 
actors are passed. This is a second problem. 
Thirdly, the tender policy leads to conflicting consequences. One of the quotations explains this 
tension: 
“One of the worrying facts of the tender policy is that organizations become competitors 
because bringing in a tender means more budget, work force, .. so the whole idea of 
working together has been outdated from the moment the tenders were introduced” 
(Interview city of Ghent) 
Hierarchy based coordination instruments 
Analyzing network literature shows that the mere existence of hierarchical coordination 
elements in network settings is not a problem on its own. However, this type of coordination 
should not have the upper hand, since it threatens the self-governing capacity of partnerships. 
Voets et.al. (2012) state that a typical feature of hierarchy is the fact that actors are considered 
relatively passive objects. This is also the case for the local partners in Ghent. Local partners 
state that the coordinator role of the VDAB is in fact considered a hierarchical role (Interview X, 
Y, Z).  One interviewee states: 
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“The central VDAB headquarters has formulated a number of directives that essentially 
mean that the VDAB calls the shots and that the others have to follow. And if they don’t 
want to follow, that is their bad luck. That is what the VDAB calls ‘coordination’” 
(Interview city of Ghent) 
Another respondent explained: 
“The VDAB has the final word. When it takes a decision, the city has nothing to say about it” 
(Interview local VDAB manager) 
These quotations illustrate that the VDAB holds a very dominant position in the partnership and 
does not seem to hesitate to formulate direct instructions. According to the local partners, the 
dominant attitude has always been present, although they have the impression that this 
mentality has increased over the years. The hierarchical role of the central VDAB-level obstructs 
a tailor made functioning of the local employment centres in Ghent, although this was the 
original ambition of the Partnership Agreement (1999). 
The dominant attitude of the VDAB is certainly linked to the input-based financing system of the 
partnership. In the local job centres, 90% of the financial means is funded by the Flemish 
government and channeled through the VDAB. In Ghent, the other partners each bring in 2.500 € 
per FTE. Hence, the share of the local partners is very limited, since the VDAB delivers in general 
more than 50% of the job centre staff (Struyven and Van Hemel, 2009). In most of the local job 
centres, the VDAB also provides the local manager. 
The yearly contribution of the partners is used to finance the daily operation costs of the job 
centre (stamps, coffee, paper, ..). All other recurrent costs are paid with VDAB money. These are 
for example the rent of the location and ICT costs (hard- and software). When we asked 
interviewees whether this financial system is unfavorable for the partnership , the answer was 
clear:  
 “Automatically. Decisions depend on who brings in the financial means” (Interview PWA) 
4.3 Reflecting on the case: metagoverning a service delivery network? 
The analysis above reveals a number of elements. First of all, while the formal features and 
discourse indicate a network setting, the actual interactions and behavior in the network and 
that of the main players in particular are more hierarchical and market like. The local job centres 
appear to be merely and only local VDAB agencies, rather than broad partnerships in which 
partners are treated equally, joining their resources (money, knowhow, …) to achieve more 
integrated service delivery.   
Secondly, our analysis shows that what might have appeared meta-governance from the outside 
is actually more hierarchical and market then network governance from the inside. From the 
outside, meta-governance was applied in the most intense form: through designing, framing, 
managing and participating. From the inside, it is clear that the Flemish government and VDAB 
did it in such a way that actual network dynamics were limited or halted. For various reasons, 
the Flemish government and VDAB have not allowed those centres to become self-regulation 
networks. The Flemish government designed the concept of the local job centres, put it in 
legislation, and defined two pillars with a different coordinator for each pillar. Although the idea 
of local autonomy to adapt the employment strategy to local needs and opportunities certainly 
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promised such a setting, the VDAB in particular applied a strict framing of the local job centres, 
demotivating the others partners involved.  
“The VDAB will always continue to set its own course, although the city wanted to take a 
different course. That also has to do with the governing coalitions: the Ghent coalition is 
rather progressive, which conflicts with the patronizing logic that The Flemish government 
now imposes through the minister of work” (Interview city of Ghent) 
The VDAB could have taken up a network managing role through the managers of the local job 
centres, trying to bring partners closer together and coordinating joint efforts. Even if those 
managers are typically on the VDAB payroll, they might have been mandated to maximize the 
partnerships’ potential. The opposite seems true: those managers had little autonomy because of 
the strict instructions of the central VDAB headquarters, and could only take some operational 
decisions. The concept of management is not related to the management of the relations in the 
network but is restricted to daily and rather practical managerial routines. 
The case shows however that consecutive choices have been made in the construction of the 
formal network (e.g. the Partnership Agreement on central level; the performance contract with 
the VDAB; the internal way of working in the VDAB,…) which could have been used to make 
other choices in the formatting of the network; other choices in the meta-governance realm. This 
is what meta-governance is about: making deliberate choices for the design of networks. The 
main conclusion is that other choices were possible and that alternative designs could have 
created other types of networking. So using the concept of meta-governance is fruitful, even 
although in this case the choices made have been contraproductive for the local networks.  
6. Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper we develop and use the concept of meta-governance in multi-level networks 
focused on local service delivery. The cases studied (the local job centres in the city of Ghent) are 
in formal terms a network, metagoverned mainly by the Flemish government. However, a closer 
look at the actual network interactions and the way key actors act regarding the network shows 
that they are closer to multi-actor arrangements with limited autonomy and dominant actors 
that act rather hierarchical or market like. This however does not mean that the attempt to make 
meta-governance more tangible by linking it up with network typologies and the coordination 
literature (that provides an instrument typology based on hierarchy, market, and network 
mechanisms) is not useful nor that meta-governance is not fit to analyze multi-level settings. The 
paper shows that we need to think differently in terms of meta-governance roles when analyzing 
multi-level service delivery networks. 
First of all, meta-governance strategies can take place in the shadow of hierarchy. This means 
that elements of hierarchical coordination matter in these types of networks. Certainly in 
mandated networks, this is essential because government often controls most (important) 
resources and uses that power to organize the network and influence its operations. Hence, a 
reflection on types of organization and on the way governments are using their formal power is 
essential. This means that alternative choices for designing local networks in this specific case 
could have been and should have been considered.  
Secondly, the paper shows that we should be careful to speak of metagovernance like a one-on-
one relationship between one government and its network. Real life in the cases reported here 
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means that different governmental tiers are involved, which calls for a more elaborate 
conceptual and empirical approach to apply the concept of metagovernance in multi-level 
settings. 
Thirdly, the use of the concept of metagovernance in multi-level networks should be developed 
further, but seems promising. Certainly in the Flemish context this is necessary: due to close 
personal and party-political links between local and central actors, in most ‘local’ networks the 
Flemish government in some way or another is involved (De Rynck and Voets 2006; Voets 
2013). The multi-level model is the dominant practice in networked policy making and 
networked service delivery.  
However, in this paper we only presented the results of a first case analysis. Our ongoing 
research shows interesting differences in the way the Flemish government is involved in 
different local networks. While the case presented in this paper shows that the governing role is 
very dominant and is in fact the meta-governance choice that has been made, there is much 
more variation in other cases. In some cases the Flemish government designs the local networks 
but keeps distance towards the operational level of the networking, giving more autonomy to 
the network partners. In other cases the Flemish government is an actor in the network itself but 
is much more dependent on local actors.  Comparative case research will help us to unravel the 
concept of meta-governance in local networks further and deeper. We hope to be able not only 
to describe the different network models but also to explain the interaction between central 
meta-governance roles, the impact of those roles on dynamics in networks and finally the 
relation between meta-governance, network dynamics and the performance of local networks.  
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